Ethereum Smart Contract Security Recommendations

From how to handle external calls to commitment schemes, here are 10+ smart contract security patterns to follow when you’re building on Ethereum.
by ConsenSysJuly 10, 2020
Ethereum Smart Contract Security Recommendations

As we covered in the Smart Contract Security Mindset, a vigilant Ethereum developer always keeps five principles top of mind:

  • Prepare for failure
  • Rollout carefully
  • Keep contracts simple
  • Stay up-to-date
  • Be aware of the EVM’s idiosyncrasies

In this post, we’ll dive into the EVM’s idiosyncrasies and walk through a list of patterns you should follow when developing any smart contract system on Ethereum. This piece is primarily for intermediate Ethereum developers. If you’re still in the early stages of exploration, check out ConsenSys Academy’s on-demand blockchain developer program. 

Okay, let’s dive in.

External calls

Use caution when making external calls

Calls to untrusted smart contracts can introduce several unexpected risks or errors. External calls may execute malicious code in that contract or any other contract that it depends upon. Therefore, treat every external call as a potential security risk. When it is not possible, or undesirable to remove external calls, use the recommendations in the rest of this section to minimize the danger.

Mark untrusted contracts

When interacting with external contracts, name your variables, methods, and contract interfaces in a way that makes it clear that interacting with them is potentially unsafe. This applies to your own functions that call external contracts.

// bad Bank.withdraw(100); // Unclear whether trusted or untrusted function makeWithdrawal(uint amount) { // Isn't clear that this function is potentially unsafe Bank.withdraw(amount); } // good UntrustedBank.withdraw(100); // untrusted external call TrustedBank.withdraw(100); // external but trusted bank contract maintained by XYZ Corp function makeUntrustedWithdrawal(uint amount) { UntrustedBank.withdraw(amount); }
Avoid state changes after external calls

Whether using raw calls (of the form or contract calls (of the form ExternalContract.someMethod()), assume that malicious code might execute. Even if ExternalContract is not malicious, malicious code can be executed by any contracts it calls.

One particular danger is malicious code may hijack the control flow, leading to vulnerabilities due to reentrancy. (See Reentrancy for a fuller discussion of this problem).

If you are making a call to an untrusted external contract, avoid state changes after the call. This pattern is also sometimes called the checks-effects-interactions pattern.

See SWC-107

Don’t use transfer() or send().

.transfer() and .send() forward exactly 2,300 gas to the recipient. The goal of this hardcoded gas stipend was to prevent reentrancy vulnerabilities, but this only makes sense under the assumption that gas costs are constant. EIP 1884, which was part of the Istanbul hard fork, increased the gas cost of the SLOAD operation. This caused a contract’s fallback function to cost more than 2300 gas. We recommend to stop using .transfer() and .send() and instead use .call().

// bad contract Vulnerable { function withdraw(uint256 amount) external { // This forwards 2300 gas, which may not be enough if the recipient // is a contract and gas costs change. msg.sender.transfer(amount); } } // good contract Fixed { function withdraw(uint256 amount) external { // This forwards all available gas. Be sure to check the return value! (bool success, ) =""); require(success, "Transfer failed."); } }

Note that .call() does nothing to mitigate reentrancy attacks, so other precautions must be taken. To prevent reentrancy attacks, use the checks-effects-interactions pattern.

Handle errors in external calls

Solidity offers low-level call methods that work on raw addresses:, address.callcode(), address.delegatecall(), and address.send(). These low-level methods never throw an exception, but will return false if the call encounters an exception. On the other hand, contract calls (e.g., ExternalContract.doSomething()) will automatically propagate a throw (for example, ExternalContract.doSomething() will also throw if doSomething() throws).

If you choose to use the low-level call methods, make sure to handle the possibility that the call will fail, by checking the return value.

// bad someAddress.send(55);""); // this is doubly dangerous, as it will forward all remaining gas and doesn't check for result"deposit()"))); // if deposit throws an exception, the raw call() will only return false and transaction will NOT be reverted // good (bool success, ) =""); if(!success) { // handle failure code } ExternalContract(someAddress).deposit.value(100)();

See SWC-104

Favor pull over push for external calls

External calls can fail accidentally or deliberately. To minimize the damage caused by such failures, it is often better to isolate each external call into its own transaction that can be initiated by the recipient of the call. This is especially relevant for payments, where it is better to let users withdraw funds rather than push funds to them automatically. (This also reduces the chance of problems with the gas limit.) Avoid combining multiple ether transfers in a single transaction.

// bad contract auction { address highestBidder; uint highestBid; function bid() payable { require(msg.value >= highestBid); if (highestBidder != address(0)) { (bool success, ) =""); require(success); // if this call consistently fails, no one else can bid } highestBidder = msg.sender; highestBid = msg.value; } } // good contract auction { address highestBidder; uint highestBid; mapping(address => uint) refunds; function bid() payable external { require(msg.value >= highestBid); if (highestBidder != address(0)) { refunds[highestBidder] += highestBid; // record the refund that this user can claim } highestBidder = msg.sender; highestBid = msg.value; } function withdrawRefund() external { uint refund = refunds[msg.sender]; refunds[msg.sender] = 0; (bool success, ) =""); require(success); } }

See SWC-128

Don’t delegatecall to untrusted code

The delegatecall function calls functions from other contracts as if they belong to the caller contract. Thus the callee may change the state of the calling address. This may be insecure. An example below shows how using delegatecall can lead to the destruction of the contract and loss of its balance.

contract Destructor { function doWork() external { selfdestruct(0); } } contract Worker { function doWork(address _internalWorker) public { // unsafe _internalWorker.delegatecall(bytes4(keccak256("doWork()"))); } }

If Worker.doWork() is called with the address of the deployed Destructor contract as an argument, the Worker contract will self-destruct. Delegate execution only to trusted contracts, and never to a user supplied address.


Don’t assume contracts are created with zero balance. An attacker can send ether to the address of a contract before it is created. Contracts should not assume that its initial state contains a zero balance. See issue 61 for more details.

See SWC-112

Remember that ether can be forcibly sent to an account

Beware of coding an invariant that strictly checks the balance of a contract.

An attacker can forcibly send ether to any account. This cannot be prevented (not even with a fallback function that does a revert()).

The attacker can do this by creating a contract, funding it with 1 wei, and invoking selfdestruct(victimAddress). No code is invoked in victimAddress, so it cannot be prevented. This is also true for block reward which is sent to the address of the miner, which can be any arbitrary address.

Also, since contract addresses can be precomputed, ether can be sent to an address before the contract is deployed.

See SWC-132

Remember that on-chain data is public

Many applications require submitted data to be private up until some point in time in order to work. Games (eg. on-chain rock-paper-scissors) and auction mechanisms (eg. sealed-bid Vickrey auctions) are two major categories of examples. If you are building an application where privacy is an issue, make sure you avoid requiring users to publish information too early. The best strategy is to use commitment schemes with separate phases: first commit using the hash of the values and in a later phase revealing the values.


  • In rock paper scissors, require both players to submit a hash of their intended move first, then require both players to submit their move; if the submitted move does not match the hash throw it out.
  • In an auction, require players to submit a hash of their bid value in an initial phase (along with a deposit greater than their bid value), and then submit their auction bid value in the second phase.
  • When developing an application that depends on a random number generator, the order should always be (1) players submit moves, (2) random number generated, (3) players paid out. Many people are actively researching random numbers generators; current best-in-class solutions include Bitcoin block headers (verified through, hash-commit-reveal schemes (ie. one party generates a number, publishes its hash to “commit” to the value, and then reveals the value later) and RANDAO. As Ethereum is a deterministic protocol, you cannot use any variable within the protocol as an unpredictable random number. Also be aware that miners are in some extent in control of the block.blockhash() value*.

Beware of the possibility that some participants may “drop offline” and not return

Do not make refund or claim processes dependent on a specific party performing a particular action with no other way of getting the funds out. For example, in a rock-paper-scissors game, one common mistake is to not make a payout until both players submit their moves; however, a malicious player can “grief” the other by simply never submitting their move – in fact, if a player sees the other player’s revealed move and determines that they lost, they have no reason to submit their own move at all. This issue may also arise in the context of state channel settlement. When such situations are an issue, (1) provide a way of circumventing non-participating participants, perhaps through a time limit, and (2) consider adding an additional economic incentive for participants to submit information in all of the situations in which they are supposed to do so.

Beware of negation of the most negative signed integer

Solidity provides several types to work with signed integers. Like in most programming languages, in Solidity a signed integer with N bits can represent values from -2^(N-1) to 2^(N-1)-1. This means that there is no positive equivalent for the MIN_INT. Negation is implemented as finding the two’s complement of a number, so the negation of the most negative number will result in the same number. This is true for all signed integer types in Solidity (int8, int16, …, int256).

contract Negation { function negate8(int8 _i) public pure returns(int8) { return -_i; } function negate16(int16 _i) public pure returns(int16) { return -_i; } int8 public a = negate8(-128); // -128 int16 public b = negate16(-128); // 128 int16 public c = negate16(-32768); // -32768 }

One way to handle this is to check the value of a variable before negation and throw if it’s equal to the MIN_INT. Another option is to make sure that the most negative number will never be achieved by using a type with a higher capacity (e.g. int32 instead of int16).

A similar issue with int types occurs when MIN_INT is multiplied or divided by -1.

Is your blockchain code secure? 

We hope these recommendations have been helpful. If you and your team are preparing for launch or even at the beginning of the development lifecycle and need your smart contracts sanity-checked, please feel free to reach out to our team of security engineers at ConsenSys Diligence. We’re here to help you launch and maintain your Ethereum applications with 100% confidence. 

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